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Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union

Edited by **Marek A. Cichocki**, Natolin European Centre, Poland
and **Karol Zyczkowski**, Jagiellonian University, Poland

'Making informed choices in politics is very important. This book offers a common sense approach towards decision making in the EU based on clear scientific reasoning. I hope that it might become of interest for decision-makers.'

– Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, former Polish Minister for European Affairs, Member of the European Parliament

From leading global experts in the fields of politics and mathematics comes this thoughtful analysis of the nature and distribution of power within the European Union and the practical implications of the current institutional design on its members. A valuable resource for scholars of political science, European studies and law, as well as to those working on game theory, theory of voting, and applications of mathematics to social science.

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